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,l GOW.'>iUNIT! STRA'rEGY FOR FULL EMPLOYUNT AlliD STABILITY 
-- •Z!fJia'Q' 
The present document whos main lines have been approved 
by the Commission, i.s intended to serve as a basis for 
the consultations \-lith the social partners which the 
Cormnissio~ will hold pursuant to the mandate gi.ven by 
the European Council for the prepaTation of the next 
Tripartite Conference .. 
... - . ,• ...... -"" 
. A. COM~.11m:e:r;( S~:sR.(\\'I~J:!Xr.t b'T.lli .:{fittt EM'1):U.'ff.MEN'~'l' kiJ'fl) STA13II~rl~lf.' 
~.t~wu.-~w1~;.~~~6.'i'i~.!'/i;l!~.w·~t!(f$YMIA~\\It',IMmr~~S\tmmo~o::'l}~~'f.i~~~·t~tt!M~"";~>.((,:.,\I'.lQlt.•..tt\~tv~•'f1.!l\tl!mW~~ 
l,t-j In ·~h~; iB·.PK''il'1g' od5 1976 tJJ:t~:f€i $.:R'e th:;J:fix:d.:t® !':·d&;I\$:~ F fen" 'MH~ Cm.ltltlu.rd·t.y as 
$1, 'Mr1Ms1~~ r ·~hx-1l:~ iru~ .... ~2.QJJ£?.m;;L.,~~E.-TJ.;!.~21!.~ .. J:lJ? .. I.\I On ·the 'ba.ai~'P of' J'~X'f£JiiHJrrt 
~t:t~r:hi.$;.~:r!,JJ(i' 11 ij, g:~::'{rri'i~h ~ln fr~··os~ ~l'.ez:ti.o:o.aJ.. p:r:·~od.uot of~ r.:-tJ:mo~:rr. 4 ~ .,.,, :t'oll<Ywi.:n.g 
f:>l, .£\,4.H.ll:Jl:ru!l cd:'' 2~,:) ';~~ i.n. 1Sq:; &lrui i.\'IOill$J l{:;i/3~ o:f me.,ma11.tttm. i.tl '\;he ·up-ru~:ril 
r.~:ri.'elo .ml;)'lJIEtn1f.JitA.~~ ••• fx•,;;m l:~~,.,!j % ·~~o ~, ;r·ert~ ~:rtil.l ~.a high tt!!ll .10 ~; $ ... ©&rA 
·~h~~ (lth~;:;r· b •. ~~,n(l ~; i"f. i.~ '~O be fea1:t'ed. ~;ha·h 1 fo:r, 
~.·-:r@:;N:,g~ ·un~:~m}.J1(.9;y·t,~~w~·~; :r():l(' 1~g76 :ma;.r·· ~~1dll l>~ 
.. :; 
1'»~\~q:;:K-J•~lnt< tt.p!dW:Lr:ag and ·j~}H~ lOJ::!gin.~,,.'t~lrili. p:r'O~f.H'J•.t:da:~ f·t".l•r iH:ICmmn~_¢ cl.~V<'.l!l{,pru~wrt~ 
., 
1fhr9:n th~.::~ (llrt:tm:l.Rtd.o ''tH.:~:"i~:-·u.rtt.~ (~f' th~ .mFdJ.t·m~~ .. teJ."m p:t'ojet::d;:lon.s fo:IC" i~he 
i:nd .. l'iridnf:l,.1 (kmlnn.ixd·ty },~i_'k:;mh"E~X' ~)i;I.:\:~<9S ~)f·f'el:• :?~o Jn()l-:'f;'1! i:h~x1 a. gh;om~~\0 ·~fie~ : 
. 1~1/{'j\.~lr.f~l~.t."..~rtm~~~ -~.· 
of ·U.H;: f\;:j;ui'e '!\'· ~fn (1~JHxp~.:rj.:ao~?~ '<rd:~h ·t.:n~ ~,.~;·fh:l.tr~wman·~~;, (Jl:i:- ·l;ha 'ten y~.nrs. 
~>:fi'.M"~~:..T'.n:.r.•~.~~~~1fJoj'ffl'>'S:.w.f"~'<.' .. ~'t"!:) " 
t>t'eo<t~d.:i.:ng· th<::i 1~174/'!:5 !'e(~e~rHd.<:m r "i;h:1'3Jf' pcd.t;t~; ·to ~ 
Th~ p91:H:~:i.mit.lJm ·~1i·:l.th rege:,x·d. ·~o g:~··ow·t:~ ~ I&J.t~a:plo~rme-):n't a:nrl .i.nflai~it·m. eme,rgir.lg· 
frt'Pm ·%h~1ae pr•o,~jecdd.<:mB lf''-i~l':"lts(:~ts ·~;he: ~xz)el"'i~n.c~ of X'li.H;er~t ~f'fHl:r~ ~} It 
1'\~~~::~~hailo~flf..;J t\ 'tr·el'ld. aJ,(H)(~~'d.:h~.g iHJ % .. /h.:i(ih ~ t.rom clyola i;o oy·file, groli'th 
. :Jr~t~~ "'l/'&'t"l /ifi~l·~'l'i·~>'•'(\l 'l'l'l'id1:>"'~-·'·~"'t,'l1)<'A<f'·1<'<'$... "·••1'~"1- "-"-~-ilf:IH'> ~·•·f\f~ ,!,t,.,, <{~·t'"'rt .. •'·.,;(,.,,.,.,.'l""'.l" ~ "I ; ,, . ..,. ,.l! .... lul,. "'~""""'" .!..!It !l "'"•l·•'"''u'\l•••l·"'~t•M~J.MII h .... ..,,J, J;,,~, .. wt"' &a·i!.VA ~.U~;p ...,,r,,~,t .. t~t?.~·t•.J!,v~<~.~<~o'Orf :ti':f).J,:f.'8J..A, 
'llfill "{;·~:n":\:~ '~'\?'1~1],n :.t'~MJ't®d{;~~~ ~'-~"k' f~ G11J)l·~r~'lli.",~"~'A!.~"'·f ""'f.11~·~j,;~, eJ w 111 l·e w. •·· ~il-'"''·!• .: .iJ. -~ • ~J,. ;,.-~/Ji..,'! .. l\ .... "M...~;~ ..~.n.ci.\e~i~ .. plr~ow 6JI.. rea. J~, ry 
~.f. l?~~ t&~.:tl ~~ey l~:a.~.:~'l't :t.:t•om ·thtt m:t~t~k(t~ r,.rl' th~ l'f;J~;IJil anrl d.t~ :tlot :$>lot 
·~h~ 'lJ,m,y flJlel~i.cl, ~ lM:IOU:.!?et~~.l~r ~l:hi. $~~:t:•·.~f1.UJ_y.,4 ~~he\~ ~lt3IDO!O:tta.·U,f.ll i~~~~·c~JJ~ :b~. "'(1EU.l1 
pt.~:U .. ti.t,f&1 ~ !tH,71~~.Xl.l ~a.Jn:d ~~!4)!M:wd.~ ina1d;t·~11.id.,t~'(ii\k\f ot i;h~ Mazub~:r st.a·t®~J· tlltl~~t. 
:Wifu1\\v ~~;d:~~r.~~~·~h®:'!!:·) 'itli ·t.A:d.i!'.i! · ~~·\:~l"'~.i~\&~.1~1~ ¢:th?.?.l1~n.~~ 1 
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II. 'rho reasons for the recess~.on a.nd the lessons to be dre.wn from it 
' ..... 
'3• . ~o roots of the reo~ssion ot 1CJT4/75 reaeh back into the' a ix:tieG t 
' . 
. •' 
· · · ~e almost uninterrupted oconomj.o growth of' the pos t-ltar period 
• I . . 
•. f .• 
. had resulted in substantially higher living standards bu.t had. 
• • • 
•. 
, ; ... 
< • ~ ' • i} '·. 
. ·... . ,. 
. .. . · 
. , .. ' 
·also increased the· need for structural change and generated 
•. 
expectations that, could not be satisfied, at least not in ~he 
shor·f; to:rm, cons.idering also the different ada.ptabili ty of the 
···/economies. At the same time the economic and monetaey interpenc-
. . . . . . 
'.· 
·.::: :. tra.tion of the ind.ustril:\1 countries among thcmsel ves gre\-1 on a scale 
• • • 1 • . • 
. . 
.... 
.·:which ~he boldeat optimists had not predicted, but so did the 
· · mutual dependence of the industrialized countries and their 
. . 
dePendence on raw materials imPor~s fro~·developing countries • 
At all events, in almost all. the member. countries; ·the. excess ot:rain 
. . 
.·imposed ·~.!LG:Nl! 'by th~ .s.?~ial .. partners·~ the government sec·tor· 
had alre~ roached a critical level at the beginning or ihe•sovcntie~ 
·while unemployment had al:teaiQ' beert on an upward tr~nd since 1965~6., · · .
· · ... 4.·without the booo't to liquidity a.saooiated 'trith the collapse of' tho 
.' ,, - .  . 
.. 
. ''(I 
.... ; ...• 
. ·~ . ~.' 
. 11 . . • 
.·. 
• : ••• , ••• • 0 • :Bretion Woods S~atom, it is likely ~ha:t tho crisis '\'tould not have 
.. \ 
···:r 
.. · .. :,.·,. ..... 
,·. 
become acute as on.rly as i'b did and in the wey it d~d. Because of 
commitmen·ts with regard to tbe maintenance. of exchange rates, thooe 
implement~ng mone'tiary policy had to oomply with sevel"S constraints .. · .· 
:l.n all the l~~mber States until 1973, the result being an unoontrol1od. 
·• explosion in money suppl)". : The exchange rate changes mado in 1971 ·. 
. . 
and 1973 also forced the Member States to make shal'p adjustments an~ 
. ihe vq in \olhich. tho dollar rate has since fl~ctuated. and th& 
· devaluations ot itn~or:tant: melribo; sta:te· currencies have add.ed to the, . 
A.J.T~ean1..v clouding ·tho 
I ' 
' ~I ' 
·,. 
'. c 
I 
·, S• Efforts to achieve greater income shares within the industrialized 
" ',- <. 
':, \1 
., 
countries have been parallelled by a corresponding st~gle at the 
world leveL~ With .. the .economic tre~ running parallel and inflation. 
tending to keep in step in the industrialized countries, and with 
the faihlre of the harvests' 1973/7 4 saw a. world-wide increase in 
X'aw materials prioes with speculation in these commodities, :'culminating 
in a 400 ·~ ~norease. in world oil prioee. 
The extent to which the sharp increase in oil prices would 
inhibf·t demand. :was unclerestimated by the governments of all 
industrialized cb'Untries, Since tho demand deriving from 
the oil cartel countries did not expand immediately folloHing 
the increase in their export earnings, a demand en:r2 opened in the 
industrialized countries 1-rhioh lt~s not. closed by economic pol:i.oy 
measures 1 because the authorities, rightly or \orrongly, l-tere 
i. 
. more . concerned lti th the infla·~ionary impact of the oil prj.ce 
' . 
. . 
increase. . The resulting demand gaps within the coru1triea llere 
·:tu:rther agt,rravated by the interdepe~dence of the economies 
af:.t"ected0 The resulting dool~ne in dem~nd and the deterioration· 
·in corporate ·pro:f'i·~s led ·~o aovero stock depletion and this in 
turn rneai-.rt lo\'rer output and 'investment L\~d higher unempl03"ment o 
This combination of national and international faotora is unlike~ 
to ooour aga.in, but the component faotors of' ·the present situation 
have lost n~ne of their severity, ei·ther at national or at international 
level. At both levels, a defensive attitude has sinoe·developede 
In the relations between the social partners, in the relations be~een \. 
them and the govez•nment, in the re.lations between the industrialized 
countries among themselves and in those between the industrialized 
oottntries and the developing countries, eaoh protagonist is far mor~ 
oonoerned with his own Ehsre of the available "oakeu than with the 
possible size of the future ''cake" i tselt. Unless there is a profound 
change in this attitude, a further aggravation o.f the struggle for 
inoome sha.rea must be expected. in the ~eoond half of the •seventies t 
entailing more inflation and morQ unemployment. Suoh a dewlopment 
could well prove too muoh tot our democratic forces. · . 
.. ' •t 
•. 
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· · :.·· 8. · . It ·is clear that in the present situation f'ull employment must be 
~ven hiGhest Er~~ri!l; ~hat is not so clear is the contributio~ 
•··· whiob a higher ~owth ra.~o oan make to solving the e~ployment pro-
, . 
. • ; blem and whether a. higher growth rate can be attained without .. unde 
_;,· 
mining stability. 
' 'It is widely- believed that. even .after a sharp e~onomic upswing, 
· unemployment in the Conununi ty will :remain appreciably higher th~ 
what it was S:t the 'beginl'l;ine ot the .•seventies, .since, 
. ' 
.w· indus·try has kept a good ~an;y l'rorkers on its books who at presen · 
.. 
· · · · are not fully employed - this would in :taot allow of a vigorous 
•' 
:. : expansion or produoti.on without the finna being ,compelled ·to tak 
on ~ore workers i 
.since p~oduction is becoming more oapi tal-intensive and struotur l 
changes are acoolorating, ~ore jobs 'are being oliminated than ar 
· being created; 
roore young people aro joinins the labour foroo ih~ old people 
.are leaving it. .. 
' t'··· 
· · (f I !l'here is no doubt that in coming years these factors will tend to 
!'fOrk against o.n inoroa.se 1n the volume ot .. employment or will tend t 
.· :r· j '' inore.ase unemployment. 
J . •. 
1· ·:1o. On the other hand~ it is also olear that.full employment oru1not be 
achieved without vigorous economic growth. ·Therefore, a. ONP ·growth 
rate must be aimed tor going beyond that which is presently rega.rde 
as feasible for the years up to 1980 (about 4·5 % on the averao;e to 
the Community. as a whole). However, a higher growth rate will boor.4 
employment only a:f'ter a substantial time-lag and will not auto.ma:tic 
restore full employment. Therefore,. direct employutent policy meas 
must be deployed. to ensure that at least the ·'oyoli'ca,l. component .of 
employment is olimina.ied as r.a.pi.d11 as· possible,. e.nd ·that the .att"UC 
.disequilibriwn on. the labour market' :Ls c'oped. .with ih; a w~ which· do 
not jeopardize t,ht . fUture scope :ror , action •. ·, · 
·. . .
. i 
.. ' 
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A high leve~ of demand is n~t ~·-s~ffioi~nt oondi tion to restore 
fUll employment; it is also necessar.r to have adequate flexibili~ 
. on the supply side. _In certain mernber countries, suppl.)r. fa.oto~s ·; 
haw been relatively' flexible and. employment haa adapted rapidl1' i 
to changes in demand. In other member countries, however* reactions 
have been slower, leading to persista.nt structural problems and · . : 
lower-overall rates of productivity growth. 
The obstacles are not just technical or financial - it is also 
··a question ot resistance to change. Greater efforts must be ma.d~. · 
to understand the fears and Misunderstandings that produce suoh 
· · ·resistance ·and to promote discussions and forge closer links between 
. I • 
. economic and social policies to resolve the conflicts. .. 
This implies· a more careful approach in the development of social 
policy to make it compatible with available resources; it also 
requires that the pattern of economic growth takes fuller account·'· 
of concerns about qualitative aspects of employment Md working 
conditions. Without these precautions, economic policy will 
continue .to meet the difficulties it has encountered in the last 
,. 10 years. 
'~ ' . 
'11. 
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·.A higher gx'O\fth ;ate will be easier to achieve if ·it is 
made part of a Community st~ategt. For one thing, the 
Membor States aooount for about half of their c:>:terna.l trada 
among themselves. Secondly, the Community prod:uoes about a ·' 
third of iihe national product or th_e vlestern industrialized 
countries Etnd. thus more than a fifth of world OlTP. A 
concerted. growth policy in the .Community 'trould thus .provide 
· vigorous su.pport for each individual ~!ember State and for 
the world economy, whereas an expansion policy pursued by 
· individual countries alone would be bound sooner or later to· 
. 
run up against the limits set.by tho requiromants of external 
. . 
· eoonomio·equilibrium, This should mak& ii easle~ fo~ the 
individual Member States to d.ooid.e to work for a more·vigorous 
exploita.ii.on of tho sool)& for g.t"owth. .. . 
·:·! ,·'t. 
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12e .. :If' the authorities should none the lass hesitate to embark 
. on a more ambitious gl'O\tlth policy, the ma.in reason for this 
' . 
: ···would be theil" ·fear thnt suoh a. policy would 1boost infla·tiotl.• 
' ·' -~ Ini'lation is still rUnning in moat ~fomber States ·far above 
• ibU::8IIIII8r • Ill 
the levels which. in the' medium term,· in the interests of 
·· internal and external equilibrium, ean ba considered. ·tolerable • 
. . . 
'r 
• '!l'he price increases o£ recent years have robbed potential 
.. 
... 
.; ~ investors of the sta.~le .conditions they need to take thoir 
'·:decisions,. and have also had a disturbing impact on oonsu."ner~ 9 
· and oountey-to-oountry differenc~s bet .. reen inflation rates 
ha.ve·led. ·l;o severe ·strain \>li thin ~he Cow.rnuhi ty. If these 
.. 
trends \-~ere to c·ontinue, the competitive situation of the 
. ,' .. 
· Community vis-a-vis non-member ·COuntries \otould suffer • 
'.:··.•, .. :;f' 
. . ~ . Considering the dependence of the Community on baaio imports from 
third countries, it is'absolutely essential to preserve its 
overall competitive position. It wouldJbe illuaor,y to imagine 
that the Community could solve its· employment problems by having 
· .• 
.. 
' . 
recourse to protectionist measurest which, on the oontrar,y, might 
ultimate11' ·result in even more unemployment, both at home and. 
abroad. 
,· 
. . 
ll. o.n'the other hand, we have eeen in recent years that there 
~· is no close positive correlation between growth rates and 
tho rate at which money declines in valuo; if anything, it 
seems that, under present. conditions, money depreciation 
.I 
· rates tend to climb ·all the higher, ·the smaller the growth· 
beillg achieved. This paradoxiCtl,l situation can be avoided .· · 
in the tuture onlt i~ .mor~· restra.1nt 
· .. ···· . 
•il 
.;. 
'.•. 
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J:~Ooial par·tners , when taking :their decisions with regard to prices 
· and wages, and by the authorities in their decisions with regard .. 
'. ' .- .· ... ,, . . 
·· . to public expenditure' and. reven~e·. This will be all the easier 
to achieve the more those concerned are certain that the 
corresponding burdens are being fairly distributed and that the 
. total real income wiil in fact be larger. The goal should ~e to · 
scale down. price increase rates gradually in all Member States to 
. a tigu.re ot 4 to 5 % per year at most; at the present time this ·:· 
goal mq seem ambitious, but it is in tact onl.7 the same aa what' · 
· , 'iiU achieved in the second halt ot the •sixties • 
. : t 
( 
·, 
14• It will be a.lf the ea$ier to achieve more growth and more st~bility 
·.the .more confidence investors, consumers and governments have when: ·. · 
taking their planning decisions. In this corutection, the national, 
'economic policies,. particularly in the monetary and tax ~reas ,' must 
·be set on a steadier course and must be more fully concerted •. In 
''. > 
general terms t ·a valuable contribution will be made to the ·ro$toration. ·. · 
. ot confidence t-ti th regard. to ·planning it a consensus were achieved. ort .· 
the m~in social and eoonomio policy goals and if all those concerned .. 
would toous their a.tten~ion more on mediwn...:term interests 
~ . . . . . . . 
.·. . 4~"-tt~ . ' .I ·. . 
IV. A Community~ for full employment and stability; 
. i 
···.· 
15• The restoration of full 'employment 'While ensuring stability is not a 
chimera but a pol~tioal necessity. It will be achieved only it all the 
democratic forces in the ~i~~~ • areas ot economic lite, in government, .. 
and in society as a whole join in an alliance for full emplotment and 
stability. The goal.:ot' full einplo1ment aPinst a background ot stability 
has alwS1's been a cha.lfe~ t:o. o~ social and economic s~tem, but the .. 
. o~llenge has never been greater than . it will be in the near tu.~e • 
. ·. 
. ' 
'.:. 
. ,. 
.; ... 
.. 
.. . 
.. . < 1";\,)~.:~.l.l.'.l_:_!! ..i.: .. 
..'' -·:· ·-···· . "" 
In the historioall7 shori J>Griod .~:"'t~e middle of 1976 i,4;t~~{~($1~~ 
end of 1977 or the middle of 1978, we m1U3t set, ~he eoonom~e$. of,·.:~h-~:,_;~~,::·~1:··:!':~: 
Community countries baok onto tbe aed1um-term~ growth course -~-·~l1~c>~:.{:t:~:. 
they have drif'ted and progress JllW't -oe made toward the o'bjecti~··::~r·. >{.·:::~"'!? 
. -~gionally and seotorall7 'balan,oe4 powih, ,:free of infiation,~-.d~th .~:-:.'··:{:;{:·; 
high level of employment. Since 'the social and economic strU.c~es .·· :··>,::>.: 
' ... •· ' 
differ between Member States, the eoo~omio and. social polic7 inst~~n,~4'· 
· · to be used for. the achievement of this goal ce.nnot be the saane in·.· •: . · .·.~·:;/> 
. :. --~~ ::·~:\ ·:··,~:~·-: 
each countr.r • .·.··_--, 
,·' 
. In the following sections, cons~quently, only e~plef;J. ·A<ri•:.··'t-ft'Pt>•hi~tWPii.~t 
· . tor discussion of how the, common go$). could be aohi~-~~~· :~~::~ ~~·i{.~f!'~~:.,o,.:;f~/:;,~;,;\~, 
· ess~ntial principles of the d.evelopntept to be sougbt;, a.~r,t1.~t~fn~;: .. _lff~~~tl 
· :,f uni~ns .and managements, and b~tween unions and management-s: :~~1:~$!~~-~,;,~f:~ ""·C'"'~-.,,,, 
, . ··hand and the authorities on the _Qtlier must, howeve~~- ~~:·~--~ ·~·-,~-~~!~~\! . 
. '· the European level. 
· Such a.n agreement should extend, to three areas t ·. 
. .. :· 
:. ·.;. an attempt to restore rapidl3" tb' genex-al economic col'lttitions >r~~;-· '; : .. , : ·. ,:0::~ 
:.',' · an optimal growth; · · .· · · · · · · .·. , · ::' . ,., .':'!:., ..'~.:(::/~ 
·a J'Gappraisal Of the role Of lab9VJ' ..,lcet policies 1 to 81'11\0l!l .. tl\~•)} ,' 
···.· .. · . :l::s t:;a::b:r :::: 1lookins am aothe pari in. t~ ~~~f~if·~~f;ir~~~ 
- a move towards a better assessmen1 ot the consequences ,of grow~h • .'>"··'::\.:.;,!~·.: 
.. :: a::e~:i:n::~:: oonte~t, in a medium-"erm prospect., • tOw~'·!:;.i;Ifk 
. ·. ... . ' ' ' :, . \• :;;.: :.'.-i-:::j;;_: 
'l'he following sections will be toQU$ed on the first o_f: tbes.e·. ·.}/;d,,~';;·\··,·r.;~·: 
,xc·.c. •• -~;·:·;'·.··;·,·.aNI!LR. which· is· the most urgent. ·:tte la.yting auocess will·. h~;.~···.~;··~\;,>.;:ib:}~/:S:;~:\/;~~ 
· ... ·.: · . ~ . .. ... . - · · ... ·. · -· · · .~ \-.;:~.iicf!r::·J~>-:·_.;_·~)·;~~:-~.~-~>;~-~-~~,~-~\· 
@P~1.1C1 on the steps taken towari.a t)le. -~ ·other ·areas • which i~PJ!· ··.·:/'':'/·,r··<}/~} 
, · .llew task to be developed ia · · .. :... . . . . · :-: .·· .. >j· ·.A~;~:];t·,~)).,~~ 
. i. '' . .-~>?:t·:. :> ?'- \~ 
,'\,.' 
. ; 
;· . 
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lSe Those aspects of' eoonomio policy 1fhioh can make th~ gx·eatest 
contribution to the :rt~pid. :reatox·a.tio~ ··of' :£"\:1.11 employment, with 
the ma.:i.ntena..nce of stability 11 Ut' the followirJg : employment 
policy 1 tsalf··~ :i.nwst.men.t policy, incJOlt\SS policy, price and 
oompetitio:n polic-y, fi.rw.noe and monetary pol.5.oy·. Their specific 
contribu.tions are dealt with in the following sections 
· · · ind.i vid.ually, bu·t the e ffeoti wneaa of the individual measures 
will be lat"gely fietennined by the othex• mea.aure~. adopted at the . 
·same time, i .,e. the individual mea.£;;m•ea. oam1ot be replaced b7 
others, if' full emplcymen·t !!!:!L atability a.re to be achieved. 
Moreover.~ alongside ahort ... ·te:em maa.aturea, o·ther e.c:tion, which . 
wi.ll take fq.11 effect \'mly in ·the medi\Ult term, ia needed\) 
Such action muert in par·tiou.lar tackle the s'h'Uctural problema 
and. iuiba.la.ncea whieh the Collk1luni ty and mo:r® speoifioally some of 
its member countries ;faoe in maey respects (J.aok of ea.pa.oity 'to 
adjust, :rigidi tiea of -~he labour ro.e,:rket, erlstenoe of declining 
industrie.s, reg:i.onal imbalsn.ces)., 
17• In the shor·t term, it would 'be a mi.sta.loo t~» e:x:pe~t tha.t a 
,· 
!.E2!.U£.ii2_n .. J~ .. ;the ..E~!L.2.£~~t would make acy ea.:c•ly and 
substarrtial contribution to the !OOlt\tion of the unemployment 
.... 
• - I . 
. ' 
'• 
.· ' . : 
p~·oblem : this is ·b:~te in raapeot of 3'J.1J3 general l''EH:luotion in the · 
. r . 
retirem~n·t ,age or raia1ir1g of th~ aohool-lea.ving agG, just as 1 t 
applies in :reapGot ot• ~ ahor·tening of.' working hours e Even 
I . 
whe:r•a suoh measure a rAe¥ seem d~si:rable for social policy reasoJ18 • 
.their ~p~ementa.tion rair~vcu~ so· ma.r~. aew::ra economic, financial 
· · · · or political problems tha·t they· oa.n be oont(Jmpla.teQ. only for 
the medium term@ 
llowevcr, there is soops for limH;ed a.otiona toward a better 
sharing ot wox•lq thay should be OOl'U:lide:r.ed b;.r acH:~ial pa.l"tne:r'o 
and gowx•r.w:,en:ts in speoifio sectors or tox~ a~.soit'io categories.-
;• -- . ·.· The :t"ollowi.ng mea.au:re!;ll a:a:•e aubmi tt$(l for diaouaaiop t 
~. eas.ier aocesa to reti~~ment to~ ~lderly· workers who ha~ ,been 
out cr work at l~aat 12 months; 
.. 
''·, '. 
,• 
. ' .~. 
,·,. 
; ;' 
; ·~ 
10 •. 
- enoouragirlg the rac.rui.'tmant of add.i tional personnel rather than 
extension of overtime : beoa.uae of erl:r.·a costs of additional 
· reo:rui tment, rerrt1•iotive 1eg:i.sla.tions conoerr1ing lay-off of 
· workers e.nd u.ncerta.intiea as to the med.ium-term demand prospects, 
firma may of"ten be more lnolined in the recovery to extend 
overtime rather ·than to ·take on add.i tiona.l workers • WhereVer 
tQ3ohnically and economically feasible, unions a.nd employers 
. 
should 'be encouraged to limit the expansion of overtime in the 
months ahead ancl thtuJ aon.tribute to a more even sharing of 
available wol"'ke Fina .. noial incentives :i.n the form of temporarr 
emplo;ymen't premiums m~ help ).n thia ;-eapeot. 
· - the limitation or1 ·iilie ro'orui tment of additional labour from 
. non...:member countries existing a inc~ 1973/7 4 in the member states· 
· ·should eo:n1;inue in an.y oaae until ·the end of 1977 • 
.. 
. · •· · .1.8o · The emphanis must however 1;e on P,Of!tt!:.:~measures for the rapid 
,. 
~ .. '' 
. ·I 
~· . '• ~. / 
,,' 
'; . 
1,',·. 
·.reduction of unemploymentp and. o·n an notive employment polioy. 
· Therefore tt is proposed to cliaoues measures such as employment 
· prem:i.uma to be granted temporarily for a.ddi tiona.l reorui tments' t 
and a.otions to ino:rea.ae emplOJ1111ent among young people. 
. . 
.~e case for cona:l.doring ~m;e?ra.rt....~l:.?:trn~:rt E,remi;u!Eft as an 
al terna·l;i ve to the p~ent of ·unemployment oompensa·tion is based.. 
:on the f'ol.lowing ~ 
. - In 1975 public expemdi tu.:r.e of the rnember oountries for the 
4,6 million r.egiaterecl u.nemployed amounted ·to 10,400 millions· 
EO'A o~ ?- , 260 EUA par u:rtamployed., 
If' one e.dds to these d:lreo·t axpendi·hu:rcs the loss in govenunettt 
r:ewnus (d.:i.l,eot ta.xea, ind.ireot taxes, sooial seouri t1 .. · 
oontr:ibutiona), the average total . ooat p~JX' unemployed to the :· .. •. 
member ooun:trias' gowxor.uner.rt~ may be estimated to have been 
ot the order ot• 3,500 .EUAg 'l"hia Vt'll.7 sttbr~·tantia.l budgErtaey· 
burden was not of':fset 'by· aey ~)roduotiw 'WOrk. ··· 
L ~ 
'it. 
... 
.. 
'. 
' .. ;::. 
~ : ' . 
'·,. t i ',• 
' . 
I ,f 
,. i ot 
·' 
. 
• 
. 
; .. Up to the lo·vel ot the di.reo·t e.nd ind.i~e~t costs or one unem:plo~od. 
person it is 8 ·in ovora.ll eoonornio, terms, better tQ pa;y the 
' : ' ' \ . 
·, 
· transfer ~ents not to the unemplo~ed persons but to tho 
firms,provided this generates additional employment. .• 
·.·' I i 
• For the firms t ernpioyment premiums 
I ' . f 
can 'be an inoel'lti vo to . increase tl1e work floroe in at least 
I' '• 
.. 
. ~ 
, ' · '· . two si tuatior1s : in the first place, new reox-ui tments become · 
I It ft .. ' 
I. 
· j. · an attraoti ve a.l·terno.ti ve to more overtime, if the authorities 
. 
' ' . 
. provisionally. aas·wne pex•t of the oostG; oeoondly, such premiums 
' ~. . ' 
,. can induce firms to bl':i.ng fo:n·m.rd staff increases orie;innll;y .. : . · · 
r • t . ·, .· ;.t 
· Qontemplo.ted ·only fqr the medium term, i ;e. to hire statt,. • : . • 
so to apeak, in ad vance 1 ·'Hi th government assistance, '"hilo the , · 
labour supply is still abunqant ru1d of good qualitT• 
In parallel td th tho temporary . .' empl•yment premiwn, -
the. follolling set" of me~surea should. be contemplated, 
their speoifio aim being the reduction of ~emnlomnent among 
11. 
.. /. 
, I ' 
low1g l!eovle; the. actual content of the measures would ho.ve ' ' . I '. " : .. t . 
· . to b'o te.i'Xored to tho orga'niza.tional and cduoa.·Honal arra.ngemet'lts 
· ··•·· · epooifio to each oountcy and to the speoifio nature: of 
.. · 
.... ·, 
' .. : 
· \Uletnployment e.mon5 young poople in.·eaoh countcy : 
.. 
• Granting of rooruitmont premiums to private and publio-oeotor 
firms. which inoroas~ tha supply of apprenticeships and 
traineeships, the premium to be substantial~ below the general 
employment premi1.1m ~u·t to be. paid for a longer period. 
• An inorease in the aupply of apprenticeships a.nd traineeships b7 · 
the public authorities (central and local administrations, railw~. 
post otfioes, scoial eeourity agenoies 0 etc.). 
, •''). 
',., ... 
.. 
'I 
i' I 
. ' 
.. 
·}. 
. · .. ·· , .. · ·., 
i . 
.. ,,,.. 
... . 
•• ''\"~•M' ''\ 
provision ot training and/or education subsidies . 
tor unskilled )"oung people attending public or inter-
firm vocational training agencies (including the basio ' 
vocational training year) and who would otherwise be 
out ot work. 
initiatives of a. labour intensive· 
~h~raoter to create new jobs, especial~ for young 
people, that would both increase motivation to work 
among young people and respond to specific 1ooal 
needs (e.g. urban renewal). 
. . 
·' 20• · At the same time, the oondi tions; must be created, thl"ough · 
~ :' I : 
· ... £i!nera.l labour market measures-, to enable structural changes . 
to take place smoothly • . . . 
In particular, more emphasis needs to be placed over the 
:medium term on the expansion of E?xleting employment policy 
··· ... instrumentse These include : 
the development of the ~\blio job placement services which 
.var.r oonsiderab~ in their effectiveness between ·countries. 
expansion and improwment ot aids tor training, re• , . ·· 
· adaptation and mobili t7 in order to better equip the l.abour·. 
to:roe to oope ·with the ohanaing.patterna of.emplo1ment. 
'I·,, 
! '. 
0 r ~ • 0 : 
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. · . 21. · The relationship between sooia.l policy 'and. active· employment ·· 
policy also needs to be considered. In recent years, Member 
· ·. States have made major improvements in social provisions to 
. reduce the hardship of unemployment and have taken extensive.' 
' legislative actions to increase job security. These sociai 
. : . protection measures must not· be put in question. However, 
'· .· . . . 
their future development must be closelY related to the 
··. forw~ looking elements of active employment policy to ensure 
that sooial employment protection contributes to the process 
of economic change and does not become an obstacle to change. 
·.ft .• 
VI. Investment policy 
22. · In 1974, gross fixed asset formation declined in the 
Community-for the first time since the end of the war, and 
• ' •• J the trend worsened in 1975. Full employment cannot be 
restored in the Community unless there is, in the short 
and medium term, a.n above average increase in investment. 
The Community's policy must therefore be to boost capital 
spending. This applies particularly for those t.Tember 
' States and areas in which gro\otth and the propensity to 
have already been wea~.in the past. 
23. Private investment will not recover unless corporate profits 
improve·,. The decline in p~ofi ts · which ~as 
occurred in all the countries will be made good only lThen 
firms are once again operati.ng nearer or at ca.paoi ty. 
The improvement in the investment climate associated with 
. this development would be decisively strengthened and 
the managements' investment "horizon" appreciably extended 
if the government au~horities $nd the sooial partners 
· oould. rea.oh a joint agreement on a. gtowth and stability · 
. policy for the coming yea.rs •. ·. . 
'· 
. I 
'I 
, . 
..• 
' . 
.. ' 
'i 
. .. . 
'·. 
...... 
'· 
.. 
,. '""*''''" 1. 
I':n addi·t:i.o11·, the following. measure~· ·to stimulate inves1;mfJnt 
··are suggested : ·. 
;..... In areas·\-tith p~rsisting high unemployment -e.g. regions 
. ( ~ in whioh unemployment hns been :Q~ above ·~he national . 
average for a.t .. lea.si t1-rO ;years ... investment subsidies 
- geared cUreotly to ·a.ot·lta.l job oreatj.on - should be 
. ·awarded for periods oov~ring several y~ars • 
• For specific categories of investment ·tho encouragement 
· . of which is in the in·t~renta of tho general economy, 
·, 
apcoia,l d.oprecia.ti0l1 :rules . or subr:ddiea should be granted 
temporarily,e.g.for the y~ara 1977-79.Relevant investments here 
··are ·build:tng invet:d;ments to save energy (hea·l; it1Su.la.tion) 1 
• • 0 
:S.11vestmcntE; to alleviate pollution of the 'tzater and the 
. 
· ~ air, and investments .to improve health and safety at the 
'tlo1"k plaoo. 
. . . . 
Another WtW of helping ·to develop a firmer investment trend, par·~i- . 
oularly' in industries which are oap:i. tal i11tensi ve and wl21erable 
to the business cyol~, ia an inf'orma·tion ayatem concerning ourrGnt i_' 
.ag:re~d or :Lntonded inves troen·t programme a. Such a system would \ ' . 
.. . · :i.norea.ae information available 'tli th :reg-~rd. to planned. ca.pa.oi t.;r -,. . 
Etxpa.neion and in this WSJ' wo'Q.ld oontt•:lbute ·~o forestalling . 
·, 
· •. invas·tmen.fa.~. likoly to prove ill-co11Cloi v~do In ·the ooa.l 
•· ·• · and f.'l'~ee~ indu~try ·fihe inves·tment :roporting p:tooedure has 
• · · . been working \·rell for iil·tenty years (11 Sino'a 19~!3 investment 
. ' 
' . 
· .re:por·hJ for. tho onere;y field have ·.also. been used. Consideration ·· 
should. ther.ofora· be' given to tha 5.dea ~f o.pplyit'lg thir? prooed'U1'ie .· ·. 
at C~wnuni ty level along sim1.lar linea in o·~hor il'ldu~trios, 
partioula.rly in those ,.rhere the · poriodio cmergonoe of e;)coess • 
(;apaoit;y is par·tioula.rly oommorao' 
i. 
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'.- 25.t~.. Since pUblic investment accounts for nearly a fifth of gross 
, · . fixed asset format.ion in the Commun~~Y ,. it is clear that this 
' ' oat_egoey of oapi tal spending is of crucial importance to the 
control of the investment trend, in particular in the 
building industey. A further advantage for the purposes o~ 
polict implementation is that the timing of investments oa~ried 
. ·.I 
·; 
.. ·,, .. 
... 
out 'by public a.nd semi-public undertakin{JJ is subject to control. ··-. ' ~ 
.. 
' ' 
_··· .. In the recession years 1CJ74/75, the scope for oountereyolica.l 
··· publio-seotor investment policy was not as fully used in 
:some Member States as should have been the case, given the 
severity of th~ decline in economic activity. 
For,coming years, the Community should base its action on the 
:f'ollowing principles in the field of public investment : 
• The share of public investment in government expenditure · 
should be raised and the shares accounted for by public 
consumption and transfer payments reduced. Many public 
investment programmes have a directly discernible impact 
on economic gro~~h or on the quality of life in the 
Community and the subsequent operating costs they entail for 
the authorities are relatively low. Relevant projects here 
~ould be in particular infrastructure schemes for public 
' ' transport and for the municipalities. 
""" .All · Member States and local authorities ·should. prepare • 
contingency budgets for 1977-79• These 'tJould be implemented. 
if and when certain maoro-eoonomio thresholds were reached 
(mainly, the 'unemployment t-a. te). This measur.e should. be 
regarded as a. concrete application of the undertaking given · 
byo the l'lembor States to prepare five-year public investmont 
progra.mmes (Artiole .. 6 ;~t Directive n° 74/121). . '\. 
' ~ •': . 
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:: • In considering public investment projec·~s as well as in 
assessing public subsidies~ greater ~~t~ntion should bo 
paid to the direct azul i.ndiretlt empl4Jyment ef'feoi;a, e. g. 
in terms of the location and quality of the jobs created; 
. . 
. it ~ be necessary to develop new me·~hods to measure 
such effects. · 
16 • 
,VII. · ltlOOmes and asset ownershiE J20l!El 
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2&. ··. An essential part of the a.llia.noe for :t'n.ll employment and sta.bili ty 
. is an a.ocepta.noe of the need for concerted action and collecti'\Te 
self-discipline regarding increases in incomes and prioeso 
. With :regard to J.nc·omes. ;eolic;zw a c:onaidera.ble contribution to 
.a practical discussion of the problem would be made if clear 
. · dia·i;inotions were made between real and money income trends 
a.nd between short-term and longer-term requirements • 
27 • With regard to money wa62~!_ends. ~ the pri.noiple must be observed 
· that the money depreciation rate l:'ega.rded as unavoidable mus·h be 
fully accounted for in -w·age agreements a~ that any price increases 
going beyond this mu..qt be a.ooowrted for Sl.1.bsequently in wage's paid, 
for if this ia no·t doria the \;ro:c·kere 't·l'Ould lose pa.rt of their fa.:i.:r 
. ·.'.' 
·':., 
aha.re ·of national inoome. l'lha:ro p:rioe inoreaae.a are due to official 
meaau.r~a (e.g. to an inoit"ea.ae in indirect taxes), this should, howewl"t. 
be ta.ke11 into aooount in the formula:~ ion of' wage policy, to avoid a11. 
a.ooelera.t:lon of ·the upward price xnovement as a. result of the process 
of simply pa.ss.ing higher pl .. ioes in thEi form of' higher wages. 
National systems of wage :imiexation would have to make a.llowanoe for 
this event as weli as the event, disousaad 1>elow, of a deterioration 
in the terms of trade" 
28. .As for ·tb.e ;real wa&!_ tpen!! r in the longer term the 
in the overall economy is the key parameter. De·v--la.tions 
t.rom this yardstick will., however, be necessary, for 
exa.tnple 9 i:f' the terms of trado were to deteriorate (o~l prices), 
. ' ~· .. 
.. ..... 
•.. 
. . 
, ' A 
. '
I· 
. .. . 
. ~ .· 
because :tn these circumsta:noea tor each import.ill1it rolativelj"' 
' '. 
·· ., ···more export ~its would have to be made available, i.e. only 
. . . 
• . ' ·,SOme, and. ~l'l certaln ciroumstancEG none at allt ot the produoti• 
... 
. 
·. ' .. 
,,. ' ' 
•. 4 
. . 
• vitT gains achi~ved \fo~d aot\liJ.lly ·aoc1•ue to the ~omestic 
8COJ10JDTe 
;I 
.• . In the short .term, the social partners must 
~so bear in mind that' as a result of the 1974/75 recession there 
has 'been a . steep increase - in the ratio of wages and salaries 
to the national product •.. The improved utilization of existing 
capacity will be accompanied d~ing the preseni upsvling by a.n 
.. 
,, 1 .. ··, 
,. . above-avarage- in,crease in labour productivit;r, bu·t this will be no more 
' . 
than the reflection of the below-average increa..c;e in produeti vi t~ 
during tho recession. If the relationship betHecn consumption a.nd. 'irtvest..-
• . 
ment- '..: .. is: to revert to normal' the trend of real \-lages must ro~ 
a timo lag behind tho' trend or productivity. \'/ago discipline' 
which will t·hus bp required of the \'IOrl~ers during the ups\dng, 
must, ho\.,ever, a.lso be honoured by· price discipline on the part 
.. 
ot the· ·firms. 
; ··." 
.. 
. ·~.··. . ' 
f 'j 
~. ..· ' .· \ 
' 29• An ailiance aiming at more sta.bili t;y will 'be extremely di:fficul t 
' . . ~ 
~ess the social partners oan be certain that wage or price restraint 
will not entail a·deterioration in the respective share of national 
· · income • In ·the present oonjunctural constellation it is pa.rtioularl7 • 
uncertainhow the factors which have the greatest impact, in the 
medium term, on the trend of nominal wages, i.e • prices and p:roduotivi tr,. · 
will develop. Should prices or produoti vi ty increase faster than waa 
,. 
assumed when the wage contracts were concluded, the result could be 
a profit explosion.whioh would be inexorably followed by a wages 
explosion. A greater elasticity of collective bargaining agreements 
could help to avoid such a course ot events. Co~ideration-might be 
given to the possibility o~· including in wage contracts provisions dee.iihg 
with unforeseen economic developments. Suoh olause.s would also . 
faoili tate the conclusion ot longer-t·e~ oolleoti ve agreements, which · 
·would in turn teduce unoerta~ntt for the planning decisions ot the ~-
firm •. · ' ,' ~ . 
,' I •' 
· .... ·, . 
·!· •• 
18. 
·30. · It.is possible that a.n incomes policy aiming at more stability 
is,' in political ·terms, eani~r to establish;·1f-.a larger proportion 
of' the :i.ncrea.se.in wages is distributed·in the form of an eq\\al 
absolute wage increase (instead of all equal rela~i.ve wage inorea.se) • 
Suoh a policy would promote distributional justice since the in-
fla:tion of recent years' has probably hit 'Workers at the lo-vter end. 
of the wages pyrmuid harder than those receiving higher incomes. 
In e.ddi tion, this policy is particularly attraoti ve in countries 
"H'here ta.xation policy contributes little to a more even distribution. · .. 
of· incomes~ Conversely, ·a. 'lighter tax burden · for ·the low 
income categories could help appreciably to encourage wage moderation•· 
3li one sbould also bear in mind that pressures fo~ wage increases have 
· ot'ten been the reflection· of other sources of dissatisfaction : 
. ~ 
working conditions.for instance have tended to lag behind improvmehts 
in liVing standards and expectations. It can be better to negotiate ·· · 
improvementa·in working conditions rather than compensate for the 
. lack of euoh·improvemente' by excessive wage increases • 
. 32. '.I'he prornoti.on of asset owners hiE a.s a contribution to a wealth re-
distribution policy has already been under keen discussiol'l for some 
.. 
·time in certain member countries. But without further initiatives ·" 
in ·this field it is t'o be feared that as in the past only a ~mall 
.ahar~ of the overall gtow·tb in wealth ikl coming years, w:ill aoorue 
to the workers. The main measures that should be studied nre of the 
following type * 
.., d:i.recrt p~tioipation of the workers in business profits (e. g. 
, the diErtribution of employees • shares .a:l;' preference prices); 
. . 
• the p~ent of investment wage bonuses, i.e. wage bon\wes 
oolely to the formation of produo~i-.re assets; 
..., promotion of worker saving througl1 statu·tory savings bon·uses 9 eto. f, 
. this being also justified by the losses dv.e to inflation which small 
CHivers have suffered itt all· the member coUl'ltries. because of the low 
210J.uint~.l intel4est rates ,payable. •. 
F\tt'thel~ J.ni tiati ves l'ti th regard . to asset ownership policy could· also help 
to counter ·&he danger that a aha.rp, upsurge in· profi ta could ·then lead to · · ·' 
· a we.ge explosion. It is up to t.he· sooial partners Md ·the govern~ 
mettts to orente th$ oondi tiona, bt the· right col leoti ve bargaining · 
agreem.ents an.d legal at'x~Mgen1ents ~ · to pr.event · this happenittg. ; ·,. 
' '' 
• '. ·, 
'. 
'. 
19· 
3lo A valuable contributi'on to th~ objective pursuit of the debate .concernine; 
·· the tai~ · distribution of income and wealth would be made if there was· 
fuller understanding of income and aase~ distribution and the trends in 
these variables. In most of the member countries; there is still veey 
. little in the ~ of reliable statistical informatio~ on this subject• and 
· this is a problem that should be cleared up as qUickly as p~ssible. 
' ' 
... 
34• P~rallel to this exeroioe, the debate on worker participation in 
·company decisions must be intensified a.t the Communi·ty level, In 
this respect, special attention is draW11 to the Commission •s Q~een 
Paper on worker participation and ·the structure of companies. ,, 
. '
VIII• Price Policy; 
· ... 
:~.:)5.~ Direct price policies are already pursued in most of the member 
countries, although with varying degrees of success. 
Although th~re is evidence to believe tha.t.interference of this 
kind in price formation can lead to inefficient distribution of 
I . 
resources in the medium term, there is no denying that lit least 
' . ' 
' . ' 
tempora.cy use of this instrument in e~ceptional situa.tions'is 
worthwhile and in certain circumstances is indeed ~avoidable 
. (e.g,·.temporacy price controls to curb inflationary upward price 
movements, reporting requirements for "spectacular" price increases). 
If a "social compromise" is to be. achieved in. certain. me!Jlber · 
countries, i.t will still be necessa:cy to ·us~. d.ireot price poli.ot 
' . 
instruments to.attempt to control the rate atwhiQh money depreciateE; 
not'only controlling the prices of go~ds and' services, bllt also rent,. 
· interest and diVidends. For the next eighteen to twenty-four monthst· · 
however' it is . the firms which should provide the main contri- '• 
bution to price policy, since they will be in a position to 
practise Erice discipline as unit costs tend to decline in the course.·. 
or the upswing. Such discipline would be the proper reflection ot 
wage ~estraint shown by the workers, which is alw~s urged by the 
employers, . a.nd it would oreate ... according to the m~tto "small . 
profit, large turnover" ... the· conditions enabling a "quantitt boom". 
to take the place of the ttprice boom". which has prevailed in the 
last tew yo ears. ' •' 
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;l6.e · The medium-term trend of £":.,bliely a.dminiat!re~ prices (e.g. pQstal 
. ; . rates' transport ra:tea t eleotrici t;r' charges) will be decisi vel;y in .. 
tlu~nced by the development of overall pricea and costa in the 
eoonomy; ~or as long as public s~rvices a.re to be provided at · . , 
rates covering coats, the state will be unable to break ~ree from 
t.he general cost and price trends. In the short term, there is 
however,· some room for manoeuvre in decision-making, which can be 
used for the purposes of promoting atabili ty. For example, the '. · 
public authorities could'undertak:e to avoid 'the imposition of 
official price increases at the same time ~-the private sector 
is inorea.sihg prices and to delC\Y increases in charges which, 
. . 
.... ··, though justified, may trigger off widespread private sector· increase 
· l7o 
'•'' 
'·' 
I • ~ 
'There is also some room for manoeuvre with regard to farm prices. 
policy 9 although. here too,· with the maintenance of the presen·t 
system, it is true that in the medhun term farm prioes will be all 
the more stable the mo1"a stable the general price level. 
Although competition policy cannot be used directly as a.n instrument 
to reach· medium-term eoonomi.c policy objeoti v~s, an effeoti ve polio; 
against pr'i.oing agr'oem~nts and cartels organising quota. systems, 
I . 
against restrictions of free competition and behaviour whioh en-
dangers ·~he unit;;' of the Common M& .. ket and lea.da to artificial 
sep~ation of markets and against power concentrations in the econom 
remains one of the essential conditions for an effeotiye solution 
to ·the existing economic and sooio-eoonomio problems in the Communi t 
· The oonti~ming _process· of concentration ha.a led ~o impol"'tant sectors 
of the economy beoomir1g increasingly independe:n·t of the market laws 
and thus also independent of measures of oompeti tion poli.cyo An 
always ~owing aha.re. of eoonomi.o produotiott is ooneentra.ted in an .. 
ever diminishing numbex': .of' businesses 9 both national and mttl ti- ·. ,, 
na. t 1 ona.l firms. · 
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·38, The European rules of competition in their present form enable 
the Commission to intervene ~~i·nst the abuse of an already, 
existing market-dominant firm. Experience. shows, however, that 
structural qhanges, in the sense of an ex-tension of the power 
.of large businesses which restrict the working or the free 
.. market, can only be prevented in a few ind~vidual cases~ In 
·order to have_ an effective Europe;n competition policy, to 
prevent damaging structural changes, it is therefore es.sential 
to provide the Commission with an instrument to systematically 
control mergers. In this w~ the creation of dominant market 
positions cou~d be forbidden. A proposal to this end haB been 
before the Council since July 1973 •. 
Additional incentives for the protection and promotion of free 
competition in the Community would also be provided by a stricter 
national competition policy in the Member States. A precondition 
for this is, howeve~, that the Member States which do not have 
their own competition laws create these first. 
Finally, measures which led to an increase in the tl"onsparency of 
the market could contribute to the reduction of the still large 
.· 
price differences for the same products or services which exist 
betweef! the' different Member States. In this respect oonsideratio 
should be given to prioe surveys for selected· products or se1•vioes . 
which would be made by the Commission 1in close cooperation with 
~he Member Sta.~es, a.nd the result of which would be·publisned. 
Through this mee.sure traders and oons~ers would be informed of . 
all the essential price differences a.nd oould exploit them• 
X. Finance policJ: 
.. 41 In a.lmos t all "' mb St t 
·' • · A~Je er a. es, govornment budgets have 
expanded in the -last five years far more than 't·rould, for 
the mcdi urn term, be in line loti th sta.bili ty requirements. 
These medium-term tenc\encies have, as a result of the recession 
in the laot 7wo years, grown even stro.nger. In 1974/7S, 
expGndi ture, m·a:Lnly beoauae . of the shn.:rp inorea.;e in income 
t:ransfcrn, {)rOW fttntor, \oihilo :revenues 1 because of the· 
recenslon, fell woefully short of the ,g:rowth in expenditures. 
· .. ~ia_ left a}.l·t~~ Member S~atos with d.efioi ts of quite 
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' ~~e deterioration of the public finance situation tollows on 
a long-term ·tendency for the pu.blio se~tor share to increase• _:·· 
· lJ:'hie :is the result of. a steady increase in the relative oosts ,. · 
of the ·tasks tra.di tionally carried out by the public 
administrations, of the exte~ion o·f the exis.ting syr:r~em of 
public services and o:r' the assumption of new tasks by the 
· .:· governmen·h authorities • 
~·-. . ., ~ ' 
. ' ~ " ' 
:o ·42• Defic;i is on the present scale cannot be maintained in the . 
medium term., .Par·t of the def'ici ts will automatically 
disappear when the recovery gets properly under wa.y. ·The 
. I 
..... 
i ' 
. ,·. elirnina:Hon of the remaining structural deficits must not be 
· carried out too hastili}'; it must be properly related to the 
further prog-ress of the eoonomy and should be. concerted 
within the Commun~ty. This general guideline l'rill.be all the 
··t easier tQ implement the greater the readiness· shown _to help, 
by Communit;y measu:res,.thos~ countries in whioh.there is most 
need for consolidation but in whd.oh consolidation will be most 
difficult to achieve. 
. . 
· ~~- How high the s·bruotu.ra.l defici ta in ·the last resort wil1 · be 
, deponds on how' high or hO\'t low the mediura-term GNP grolrth rates 
prove to be; more growth therefore means also more scope for 
· covering public needs. Conversely,· if unemployment persists, 
the·time will. come,sooner or late~,when interns of stabilisation 
policy·-~ t l<rill be no lo~er responsible policy to finance on a 
· n1one·tacy basis, aa .in 1'974/76, the a.dditj.onal expenditure needed· 
·to secure omploymen·t and incomes. Ta.x increa.sas would thert 
be ur1avoidable unlest~ pri\l'a.iie saving lef't enough soope tor 
. . : ·. ~ . . . . . 
additional publio 
•• 
' .... < 
.. ' 
' . ~· ' 
. ' ' : 
I', ' 'j ' I~~. , ; .• 11. 
'.' 
. •,' •, 
I . ', t .. 
. .......................... . 
' ' ' 
~·:i~~ ..... , '~~~- • .._--....... . ............ ....... 
. : ·: •! 44~: However the government budge·ts are mainly consolidated· .,. 
I·.' I . 
whether through re·trenchmer.rt. Ol' tax increases .... it wil~ in 
·.any ca.se be. important ·to avoid provoking :reactions wi.th 
'• I• 
·'• 
. . , 
'' '. 
· .. 
.· ·· .. • 
·.: :1 
regard to wages and pi'ioe poli_c;r li.-a.ble ~o oonfliot with. the . 
aim of ata.bil:l ty. This means· tha.t there must 'be prior 
oonoer-ta.tion wlth the unions a.:rld empl.oy~ra·~ . The need 
tor oop.oerta.tion '"ill be particularly marked where, for . 
example 7 for the pu.rp~.'>ae of combating unemployment, _.measures 
are'oontemplated leading di:r.eotly to a. permanent increase 
ir1 publio expend.i ture (e.g. reduction in the statutory 
retirement age),. 
45~ Public expenditure and revenue ha.ve reached veey high levels 
in all mqmbe:r countries; .more success in establishing steadier 
public finance polioy would therefore make it appreciably easi~r · 
to put the economy on a steady medium-term growth pa.th. 
This ca.nno·t be d.one "{{d thout the introduction or the extension 
·of public finance plans covering 1:1evera.l years, and these 
plans should haw more binding force than is the case at 
present. The main linea· of these plans should also be 
concerted within the Community. 
: XI e' Mone ta;ry ;eo 1 if'~ .· 
·· 46• If the tm:lons and managements on the one hand and the 
authori·tiea on the other can agree on the principles of a· 
policy for full employment and stability, monetary policy 
.will a.aaume a new role. I11stead of, as in the past, either·· 
I 
passively financing the inflation process or through abrupt 
restraint measures starvil1g those seotora of the economy 
~rhich are particularly sensitive to changes in interest 
ra.tea, monetary policy could well be used as an instrument 
'tq ensure more steadiness in the medium term. The aim 
should. be an expansion in monetary supply concerted within 
the Community and related to the medium-·~erm scops f.or growth 
of the GNP and. to the ra.te of inflation regarded as \l.navoi.:. 
da.ble i.n the ;.ndi '\~dual Member States. . 
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47 • A poli.cy of publicly announcing in advance the degl'ee of 
expansion of the money supply would provide olea.r indi'ca.tors 
for the unions a.rJ.d managements and for the government 
authorities; a.t the present time this is dona only by one 
central bank~> 
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!lR ax•gunuH.:rt in f'avctu.r (;pf l~uch o. rH>lioy ia ·that in ·the med:i urn term 
there is a. relatively oloae oorrelatJo:o. between thE! expa..llaion. of' the 
money supply anti the grt.lWt·h of overall e.xpenrl:l ture in the ecc:mc.mJy ~ 
although in the ahox·t term the rt=Jla:t:i .. om.)b.ip c~m ba conai dere.bly 
d.istort~d b3r- fluctuations in the velr.>~;;i ty of (dl"C1.'l.lsti.on of mozH~Y•J 
:!.1l1erefore auoh a policy should. be introduced. .as lH.:H'n as possible 
in .all ·t;h.e member co1.mtri.e£:1 a.:nd should. be c.cmcert.ed at Comme..tx!i ty lr.:Nal. 
If' shoX'·t; .... ruvl med:b:t.m-:term t:~.':lcn .. "'dination of mon.{d;ar;/' arld. finaiHH~ poli.cy 
wli thin the Comnnmi ty '\>t(~r(".: achieved &\."'1 importaJ:A.t precond.i tion. ·t-;rould be 
fulfilled ~nabling cos·t anrl. price trend~:; in the membnr count:;:·i~s to 
· hs ht•ouglrt gre,d·i.t.&.lly oloti~G~r ·toge1;h~r and excha:tlge :t'e\t.-es wi i;h:tn 'the 
Comn.nmi ty to be s1;al:d.li zed~ 
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